Southern Illinois University Carbondale

OpenSIUC
2004

Conference Proceedings

7-21-2004

What is Markets Won't Work? An alternative
Market-Based Instrument for Water Allocation in
the Presence of Irrigation Subsidies and Social
Value for Instream Flows
Mathis

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ucowrconfs_2004
This is the abstract of a presentation given on Wednesday, 21 July 2004, in session 27 of the UCOWR
conference.
Recommended Citation
Mathis, "What is Markets Won't Work? An alternative Market-Based Instrument for Water Allocation in the Presence of Irrigation
Subsidies and Social Value for Instream Flows" (2004). 2004. Paper 38.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ucowrconfs_2004/38

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conference Proceedings at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 by an
authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.

What if Markets Won’t Work? An Alternative Market-Based
Instrument for Water Allocation in the Presence of Irrigation Subsidies
and Social Value for Instream Flows
Mitchell Mathis
Research Scientist
Director, Valuing Nature in Texas Program
Houston Advanced Research Center
(281) 364-4023
mmathis@harc.edu

Increasing water scarcity, driven by growing population and water demand, has widely
demonstrated the need to achieve more efficient allocation of water. For a variety of
reasons including heavy subsidization, the price of water faced by users is typically well
below its economic value, leading to well-known inefficiencies. Legal, political and
social constraints make the removal of such subsidies difficult. Within this context,
markets for tradable water rights have become a favored approach to overcoming price
distortions such as irrigation subsidies and to achieving efficient allocation of water. Yet
water markets also experience important challenges and limitations. After discussing
many of the practical and theoretical challenges to implementing water markets, this
paper considers the allocation of water in the face of two common distortions: (1) when
in-stream flows are imbued with social value from ecological, recreational, and aesthetic
uses, and (2) the presence of irrigation subsidies. While, in theory, markets can correct
the distortion caused by water subsidies, the public good value for instream flows leads
the market to fail. Thus, even if water markets can be established, they do not achieve
efficient allocation when instream uses are considered. The rest of the paper explores the
question: if markets cannot achieve allocative efficiency, are alternative economic
instruments available that might accomplish this objective? A simple general equilibrium
model is developed to explore the use of a two-part tax instrument to achieve the optimal
allocation of water when instream water has social value and irrigation is subsidized.
This two-part instrument combines taxes on the economy’s inputs (other than water) and
outputs to correct both the distortion caused by an irrigation subsidy and the public good
externality associated with instream flows. This instrument has the desirable qualities
that (1) it does not rely on the existence of well-defined and transferable water rights or
perfectly functioning water markets, and (2) it overcomes the political and social
constraints on manipulating the price of water directly.

